– Turkey looks to the Spanish mirror (2) by ANTONIO AVALOS, MARIEN DURAN*

If we briefly analyze the process that could explain the institutional stabilization in Spain from 1982, we have to consider 1977 as the key.

In 1977 the political and the economical actors (entrepreneurs and syndicates) signed an agreement, the Moncloa Pacts, considering the alarming situation in the economical and social issues. The effects of the 1973 oil crisis delayed Spain’s early transition to democracy, with a high degree in inflation and unemployment. Without the Moncloa Pacts it would have been very difficult to achieve an institutional commitment from the political and economic actors, as well as from society and people, to drive the country towards a democratic regime. This made it possible to put forward a more social Labor Law for workers. Turkey lacks a deep social reform that could diminish the effects of the neoliberal policies that Turgut Özal began to implement in the 1980s. This is essential to improve the situation of the workers and the social services that are clearly loss-making related to the problems of rootlessness and poverty. It is necessary not only to provide a safe legal environment to the capital but to the citizens in order to offer the opportunities to develop safe and free lives. The State must guarantee the rights and liberties of its citizens.
Concerning religious issues, in 1979 the Spanish state signed the new Concordato with the Holy See (agreement with the Vatican), reforming the 1953 agreement to adjust to the new democratic reality. This agreement clarified the role of the Catholic Church in Spain and separated definitely the State from the Church, recognizing the freedom of worship and thought. However, even today there are a lot of problems related to inequality of different confessions from Catholicism, due to the character of the majority of confessions the Catholic Church traditionally had in Spain. This implies a deficit in religious freedom, but a short-term solution is very difficult. This also leads to problems when enforcing laws that attempt to be morally neutral: divorce, abortion, rights to achieve legal equalities (as the recognition of non-married couples in coexistence, or homosexual marriages) and mainly issues regarding education. In Turkey the problem lies in the religious legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire and the response from the republic through the State’s laïcité as a guarantee of the change that initiated the republic. In this sense laïcité became the basis of the legitimacy of the State as Islam proved to be at another time. Laïcité limited religious freedom in many areas, not only for Sunni Muslims, but for other confessions also, non-Sunni Muslims (such as Alevis), as well as non-Muslims (such as Orthodox Christians) with historic roots in Turkey. Turkey was opened with the statement of the 18 points of Feb. 28, 1997 during the last decade. This crisis manifested the religious problem in the political arena: the secular/religious cleavage. The army, as a foundation of the republic, considered itself the guardian of laïcité, confronting the emerging political forces rising from the society and inspired by religious moral foundations.

Nationalisms, an embedded issue in both countries, coincide in a very thorny subject: the terrorism of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Freedom for Basque Lands, ETA) in Spain and the violence and separatism of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. Furthermore, we have to consider other unsolved historic claims, like the Catalans in Spain or Armenians in Turkey.

These unsolved cleavages define Turkish political life: nationalisms and religious issues. These pendant issues resurged in particular throughout two events: Spring of 2007 when the problem of religion clearly showed this problem was not already solved; and the general elections in July with the 14 percent in the polls pointing towards the extreme nationalist right, represented by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), improving the previous results and using terrorism as the central issue of its campaign.

In the case of Spain, the role of the head of State (and of the army) comes from the dissolution of the Francoist regime as well as the result of an agreement among all the political forces that participated in the transition to democracy. In the case of Turkey, the election of the head of State has become a problem for the veto and the lack of consensus. The head of State, if applicable, has to be a symbol of neutrality and an arbitrator in conflicts of the national political life, without the possibility of a direct political intervention, but as a moderator of political life. The head of State has to be a model of prudence and continuity of the democratic institutions by which the nations are ruled, never a source of conflict of the system.

The stormy times of the transition to democracy in Spain began to be appeased when the social democrats won the general elections after the coup d’état attempt in which unity inside the army was not achieved and the role of the head of State was significant because King Juan Carlos, as well as the people did not support the movement. Proof of it were the massive demonstrations that wanted to support the transition to democracy after the coup d’état attempt in 1981, never experienced before in Spain. Finally, it was the success of the people’s will that supported the reforms against the conservative temptation. The following decade after the victory of the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) was characterized by continuous reforms of institutions and in the society that led to a stable democracy. Moreover a European and international recognition was expected. None of it was done without cost — and it was not easy, at least as much as it seems to be when we look to the results.

The Spanish process contributes to the experience of several ways to try to reach agreements of minima that could cause a transition to a stable democracy in Turkey. However, more than two decades separates both processes, and this shows different kinds of problems to Turkey. These differences show that Turkey’s possibilities of attaining success in its aims depends more on the domestic pacts than the international situation, although the EU played and will play an important role in achieving this. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) wants to look to the Spanish 1978 constitutional model, inspired by the German 1949 constitution (Bundesverfassungericht). However the letter of the law is not sufficient. The process to the constitution in Spain was not a peaceful one, and it was preceded by an important political pact that removed the barriers to the participation of every political actor (political parties, syndicates, even the old guard of the Francoist regime) and every idea. Furthermore, the important economical and social pact (Moncloa Pacts) provided certain social peace. Yet these were not sufficient, and there were political rejections of the political and social demands, rejections that cannot be waived before, to build coexistence on the basis of common values and the democratic institutions. Even today the debate is open inside a framework provided by the constitution about the common values, the political and social demands. Moreover this 1978 constitution, which is not perfect, forced actors to sit down at a table and discuss. Without a new political and social pact that takes into account the history and looks towards the future, advances will not occur in Turkey.

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*Antonio Ávalos is researcher in the Group of Studies on History and Theory of International Relations and honorary professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Autonomous University of Madrid. Marién Durán is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Granada.

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– Turkey looks to the Spanish mirror (by ANTONI AVALOS, MARIEN DURAN*).

The advance of the general elections in Turkey arose into the arena of hot international political issues this spring. They should have been held in November, but were instead held in July of this year.

This advance was caused by the political crisis that Turkey is and has been experiencing since the very first moment of the election for the new president of the republic in April. This crisis began with the statement of Chief of General Staff Gen. Yasar Büyükanit, published on the Internet on April 27 and followed by the Supreme Court’s decision to repeal Parliament’s vote. The main reason was the refusal to accept a member of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) as the holder of the highest position in the republic. This provoked demonstrations throughout the country supporting the republic’s laïcité and revealed one of the bigger divisions in the system. The chief of General Staff’s online statement introduced a new type of military intervention into politics that the media called an “e-coup.” All the demonstrations were prompted by this e-coup and proved to be important events in recent Turkish history. Thus, this mobilization of the people would not weaken nor erode the government’s party, as was noted in the results of the polls on July 22, with approximately 47 percent of support going toward the AK Party program.
After these poll results, Turkey approaching the shore of a lake, with possibilities including the successful landing on a democratic shore, or sinking due to dangers threatening the crossing. The boat was built by the progressive economic growth the country recently experienced, a drop in the level of corruption within the government, the improvement of local governance, the deepening of democratizing reforms and respect for human rights. Furthermore, an improvement in the negotiations with the European Union can be observed, a favorable wind in this crossing. The governmental and economic results were proved by the elections in July and this could be an opportunity to gather a new momentum for political change, if this government is able to take advantage of the positive situation. In the future, it is possible that these elections could be considered the “elections of change” in Turkey. The challenge of the election of the president of the republic that involved the reaction from the military is indeed a turning point, without which progress can not take place with whatever suggested reforms taking place in the regime. This situation obviously requires some kind of gentlemen’s agreement among all political actors, as well as societal support for the reforms. According to this, the election of former AK Party Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as the new president was politically driven, as never before. The future of reforms needed in Turkey in order to achieve a stable democracy must follow a political profile. They must not only have a strong commitment to maintaining the constitutional foundations of the republic, but also must include a strong commitment to reforming the Constitution.

If we look for parallels in contemporary history, Spain’s transition to democracy gives us an original example and a model of change from an illegitimate, authoritarian regime and weakened by its own tenure. In 1982, “elections of change” were held in Spain. The Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) received more than 48 percent at the polls in a milestone victory that underpinned the new system’s legitimacy and the new democratic institutions. This was the primary factor that overcame the crisis that lead to a coup d’état attempt in February 1981. The result was the containment of the Spanish army in the barracks. The army had a decisive role in the political constitution and the support of the previous regime, Francoism — an authoritarian regime with an important amount of anti-modern elements — as it was the role of the Catholic Church legitimizing the regime. The army moved from a central position to become one of the State’s institutions and became controlled by the civil power. The army moved from a central position to become one of the state’s institutions and was subjugated to civil authority. The army gave up political power and became a modern army, responsible for its duties as a part of the state.

The paths following both countries display some outstanding resemblances and contrasts that deserve to be briefly analyzed. If we begin our analysis with the international environment, we see that Spain began negotiations for accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1977, during the transition to democracy, and it gained accession in 1986 when the Cold War was in its second period, before fading because of the fall of the soviet regime from 1989 to 1991. In 1959, Turkey began early attempts to become an associated member of the EEC, when it was considered as democracy (Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”). After several ups and downs in contacts with the present European Union and domestic political events, last year’s situation was not the most favorable one: after Sept. 11, 2001 we cannot avoid the troubles that religion imposes over the creation of a global international society. On the other hand, the position that religion occupied in regard to Turkey’s domestic realm, taking into account that the secularizing regime caused the position, was absolutely contrary to the political arena, apart from the rule that the army tried to exert on the state to control religion.

Furthermore, the fall of the bipolar order in the international realm (established during the Cold War from 1949 to 1989/91), opened new windows. However, these windows are not necessarily good for Turkey and its EU candidacy. The criteria that the European Council in Copenhagen in December decided to consider from that date on in accepting new members were not in force when Spain became a member of the EEC. These requirements are: the rule of law, with all its features; human and minority rights; and economic criteria apart from the acquis communautaire. Spain had time to obtain it when it was already a member of the EEC due to the very different international environment and the concern to have no more dictatorships in Western Europe. One of the examples of this process in Spain is the design of a coexistence framework in which the minorities have their place, under debate even today. This framework (Estado de las Autonomías, State of the autonomous regions) has brought something new in the always difficult search for solutions to the problem of nationalities inside the modern State. Turkey has a multidimensional problem that directly affects minorities and their political coexistence in the same territory, a problem that has to be solved before becoming a member of the EU.

Moreover, regarding domestic issues, not only nationalities, but economy, terrorism, the role of religion, military interventions and the role of the head of the state in both countries are also susceptible to comparison. We could consider the comparative framework in two periods: in Spain from 1977 to 1982 and in Turkey from 1983-2007. In 1983, the situation in Turkey after the coup d’état of 1980 was similar to the situation during the early transition period in Spain in 1976-77. The military intervention in Turkey in 1997 correlates to the attempted coup d’état in 1981 in Spain. In regard to the Spanish case, the stabilization of the democracy started in 1982 when the PSOE won the general elections. In Turkey the elections of July 22 may bring forward a stabilization process.

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*Antonio Ávalos is researcher in the Group of Studies on History and Theory of International Relations and honorary professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Autonomous University of Madrid. Marién Durán is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Granada.
06.09.2007

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